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1. Introduction
1.1. New Challenges for Labour and Labour Law
1.  Turner (2019) wrote: “the biggest question in the next ten to twenty years 
is not going to be how to stop AI from destroying humanity, but how 
humanity should live alongside it.”1 The 4th industrial revolution is said to 
differ from the previous industrial revolutions2. We are now witnessing in-
telligent systems able to simulate Human intelligence to a point where 
they surpass Humans, in efficiency and in speed, in the performance of 
certain tasks. AIs are expected to have an unprecedented impact on la-
bour, given the risk that they replace humans in intellectual and creative 
tasks and occupations, that were thought to be out of machines’ reach. 
There is, however, an ambient uncertainty as regards the extent of AI’s 
impact on labour. Depending on whether one is a technology optimist, 
pragmatist or pessimist,3 AI’s ‘invasion’ of the labour market is viewed dif-
ferently: pessimists warn against the negative economic effects of abrupt, 
quasi-total automation4 while pragmatists and optimists view automation 
as being economically beneficial in the long run.
2.  The 4th industrial revolution raises thorny issues in most of the branches 
of law. It remains difficult, however, to pinpoint the ways in which labour 
law may be affected conceptually. Indeed, a number of peculiar questions 
arise when it comes to the preservation of the conceptual uniformity of 
the constitutive elements of employment, namely, the status of employee, 
the roles and functions of the employer and the functions of remuneration. 
Should labour law apply to agents that are Non-Human, but are – or may 
become – sufficiently similar to Humans that they may be assimilated to 
the latter? Should a specific type of legal personality be created in favour 
of intelligent systems, enabling them to enter into agreements, enjoy the 
benefit from workers’ rights and be subject to employer scrutiny? Will 
remuneration continue to be a defining element of employment, in an en-
tirely automated, future labour market?… 
1 Turner (2019), p. 37.
2 Industrialization (1st revolution), Mass Production (2nd revolution) and Automation and Digitalization (3rd 
revolution).
3 Berg, Buffie, Zanna (2018), p. 118.
4 Idem, p. 119.
101VOLUME IV \ n.º 2 \ maio 2020 \ 99-137
The Emergence of 4.0. Employment Contracts: on the Need to Redefine 
Employment in the Context of Automated Labour \ Ljupcho Grozdanovski
3.  Our experience with non-standard work5 shows that there is a tenden-
cy for new technologies to ‘fissure’ the traditional labour law concepts, 
thus reinforcing the need for enhanced protection of the workers. Deak-
in (2013) refers to a segmentation of the labour market, given that the 
latter “is divided or structured in a way which is reflected in the forms 
taken by the employment relationship or contract. It is associated with 
the division between ‘core’ and ‘atypical’ employment in some context, 
and that between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ employment in others.”6 In this 
segmented labour market, labour law’s protective function is challenged 
because, due to the blurred dividing line between salaried and independ-
ent work, there is increasing uncertainty on the classes of workers who 
can make a claim for statutory protection.7 Atypical work rebutted the 
Fordist assumption that the notion of employment is homogenous.8 It did 
not, however, eliminate the assumption that, however atypical the work 
arrangement, the workers are invariably Human.9 Thus far, new technolo-
gies have managed to dehumanize aspects related to the work organiza-
tion (e.g., platforms do not exercise direct and personal scrutiny over the 
platform workers). AIs go a step further: the dehumanization stems, not 
from the absence of human control in the organization of tasks, but from 
the fact that the task-performers are non-human. In this context, if the an-
swer to the question ‘what is labour law for?’ is ‘workers’ protection’, the 
ever-growing AI ‘invasion’ of labour triggers the question ‘who is labour 
law supposed to protect?’ Algorithms and robots?… 
4.  These are relevant questions, given the pace at which technological pro-
gress unfolds. If one imagines that all of the countries experience same-
speed AI-induced labour replacement, the consequences for some 
developing countries may be catastrophic: automation’s ‘take over’ of 
occupations will be 69% in India, 72% in Thailand, 77% in China and an 
alarming 85% in Ethiopia!10 On a global scale, not all markets are prepared 
5 As this study focuses mainly on salaried as opposed to independent work, non-standard work will 
be understood as designating non-standard forms of employment, defined as a “grouping of employment 
arrangements that deviate from standard employment. They include temporary employment, part-time 
work, temporary agency work and other multi-party employment relationships, disguised relationships and 
dependent self-employment”. See iLO repOrT (2016), p. 2.
6 Deakin (2013), p. 1.
7 DaviDOv (2014), pp. 10-11. See also Waas (2010), p. 53.
8 LuDera-rusZeL refers to the Fordist model as implying the standardization of production resulting in a 
homogenous workforce. See LuDera-rusZeL (2016), pp. 409-410. 
9 See HenDrickx (2012), p. 114.
10 Technology at Work v2.0. The Future is Not What It Used to Be, Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & 
Solutions, 2016, available at: https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/reports/Citi_GPS_Technolo-
gy_Work_2.pdf (10.05.2019).
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to integrate AI and not all countries have the capacity (adequate Social 
Security Schemes) to deal with a drastic rise in technological unemploy-
ment. For the purpose of the present study however, we shall focus on 
labour law issues that may arise in countries that do present some level of 
readiness to begin – or increase – AI use on a business level. 
5.  The rapid take-over of AIs in various market sectors inevitably gives rise 
to the issue of regulation in the field of labour: should the labour mar-
ket self-regulate AIs or should there be some form of public regulation? 
Here again, the priorities vary between different countries and world re-
gions. In Europe, the main concern is ethics. The Europeans (mainly the 
EU) do not seem favorable to an overly detailed AI regulation, the focus 
being put on the establishment of a common ethical standard applied in 
AI inception and use.11 Alternatively, in the US, AI is viewed as a com-
ponent of commerce. In the American view, AI is as a market phenom-
enon,12 that, albeit original does not require specific regulation. Existing 
legal provisions (Commercial law, Intellectual Property Law, Contract Law, 
Labour Law) would apply, should there be a need for some form of legal 
protection. Although regulating AI is not the primary issue in this study, 
it is a point that needs to be raised. It is likely that, at some point in the 
future, national, regional and international regulators will be encouraged 
to consider the enforcement of either general or sector-specific regulato-
ry frameworks. For the time-being, however, there seems to be a wait-
and-see approach, which we already witnessed with platform work:13 
regulators are more keen on defining principles (like those on ethics or 
on liability14) and applying existing regulations to specific AI-related legal 
issues that may arise. 
6.  Although the notion of labour evolved, modern-day labour law still pre-
serves a historic legacy in that it “draw[s] the lines between public regu-
lation; private ordering, and various forms of collective and autonomous 
self-regulation.”15 Labour law thus “prescribes a ‘division of labour’ 
11 In this sense, there seems to be a principle-based approach in determining the regulatory methods 
that should be used for the time-being as regards AI use. In the EU, a High-Level Expert Group on Arti-
ficial Intelligence was set up by the European Commission for the purpose of drafting Ethics Guidelines 
for Trustworthy AI. The Guidelines are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eth-
ics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai (10.05.2019).
12 In the US, in the Future of AI Act submitted to Congress in 2017, Section 4 deals with the establish-
ment of a Federal Advisory Committee on the Development and Implementation of Artificial Intelligence. 
See https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4625?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%2
2the%22%5D%7D (10.05.2019).
13 The wait-and-see approach is the expression used in HaTZOpOuLOs, rOma (2017), pp. 81-127.
14 See for example, European Parliament Resolution, Civil Law Rules on Robotics, TA (2017)51.
15 munDLak (2011), p. 316.
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between different forms of governance and the method of interests’ rep-
resentation in each.”16 As AI gradually pushes Humans out of the labour 
market, it becomes increasingly important that future regulators attempt 
to strike a balance between market efficiency (which favors AI entry in the 
labour market17) and statutory protection (aimed at the Human workers 
threatened by AI replacement). The purpose of the present study is to 
assess if, like non-standard work, automation of labour will trigger the 
need to rethink and redefine the constitutive elements of employment, 
ultimately answering the question of who – and how – should labour law 
protect, as intelligent systems gradually creep in various sectors of the 
labour market.
7.  Section 2 focuses on the AI-induced labour replacement. Indeed, in order 
to consider the legal apprehension of AI, its economic effects must be 
defined. We shall, therefore, focus on the main schools of thought relating 
to the occupations that are most threatened by AIs (2.1.), the extent to 
which Humans may be replaced in those occupations (2.2.) and the mar-
ket and regulatory contexts that may encourage or hinder the evolution of 
the AI-induced labour replacement (2.3).
8.  Section 3 focuses on the notion of Artificial Employees, as a possible 
future category of workers. Aimed at determining whether non-human 
agents can be considered as salaried workers, this section includes an 
analysis of the possibility for AIs to be considered employees (3.1.) and 
the prospect of recognizing AI legal personhood (3.2.). 
9.  Section 4 provides an analysis of the ways in which intelligent systems 
affect the control and assessment techniques, used by employers, in the 
monitoring of their employees. We shall inquire, in this context, if the fea-
tures traditionally associated with subordination should change or should, 
rather, be ‘updated’ when AIs are the object of control (4.1.) and when 
they are the instrument of control (4.2.).
10.  Finally, the study will raise the issue of remuneration and the risk it may 
become obsolete as we get closer to a post-work society (Section 5).
11.  Section 6 includes the main conclusions on the possible future alterations 
of labour law, considering the analysis provided in the previous sections.
16 Ibidem. See also HeppLe (2011), p. 31.
17 In economic theory, market efficiency essentially implies an optimal distribution of resources. From a 
Coasian perspective, an efficient market is characterized by a well-defined assignment of property rights. 
See kuecHLe, riOs (2012), p. 130.
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1.2. Relevant Definitions
12.  The term ‘artificial’ is intuitively perceived as the opposite to ‘natural’. 
Based on the distinction between physis (nature or reality)18 and logos 
(intellect and/or consciousness),19 Romportl (2015) suggests that artifici-
ality, as a static quality of AI, resides in the physis-realm since the agent – 
material or immaterial – is not natural per se. The simulation of Humans, 
as a dynamic process, occurs in the logos-realm, given that non-natural 
agents are increasingly able to possess and develop the Human skills of 
seeing, recognizing and manipulating an object, speech recognition, etc. 
Romportl (2019) uses the expression “artificially built naturalness”20 to 
refer to the basic feature artificial systems:21 they are non-natural agents 
capable of replicating cognitive processes qualified as natural. 
13.  The term ‘intelligence’ is a “joined capacity to comprehend and antic-
ipate how the things may plausibly behave or change now or in one 
step forward, and encountering these intuitions to decide the necessary 
actions/modes to make.”22 Natural or artificial agents can be considered 
intelligent if they succeed in navigating in, and manipulating an environ-
ment that remains entirely or partially unfamiliar to them.23 
14.  The term ‘AI’ can be defined as a system that displays intelligent behav-
ior by analyzing its environment and taking actions – with some degree 
of autonomy – directed at achieving specific goals.24 It can be inferred 
from this definition that the key AI feature is that of autonomy,25 as ex-
pressed in three interdependent aspects: a so-called reactive autonomy, 
implying the capacity to mobilize a set of skills in reaction to external 
stimuli; a so-called cognitive autonomy, implying the ability to analyse, 
reason and learn in unfamiliar circumstances, and a so-called teleologi-
cal autonomy, implying the ability to problem-solve and achieve a specif-
ic goal, even if the exogenous factors are not fully known. The concept 
of autonomy is crucial for the purpose of determining whether AIs can 
18 rOmpOrTL (2015), p. 212.
19 Ibidem.
20 Idem, pp. 215-216.
21 In its most developed form, an artificially built system would succeed in displaying the same ‘natural-
ness’ as a Human being. This is one of the features of the so-called Turing test. See Turing (1950). For a 
brief comment of the Turing test, see pennacHin, gOerTZeL (2007), p. 8.
22 ZaDeH, pOWer, ZaDeH, (2019), p. 6.
23 pennacHin, gOerTZeL (2007), p. 14.
24 European Commission, Artificial Intelligence for Europe, COM(2018) 237 final, p. 1.
25 nOf (2009), pp. 16-17.
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be fully autonomous agents, deserving – perhaps – of being considered 
as legal subjects. Our analysis in Section 2 aims at elucidating this issue. 
15.  From the perspective of the typology of intelligent systems, they are 
generally classified in three categories. On a scale crescendo going from 
specialized to general and/or super-human cognitive abilities, AI can be 
Narrow (ANI), including systems that are specialized in a specific area 
such as IBM’s Deep Blue or the supercomputer that beat Gary Kasparov 
at chess in 1997;26 General (AGI), comprising systems able to perform 
most, if not all, intellectual tasks like humans27 and Superintelligence 
(ASI), consisting of smarter-than-humans systems across the board.28 
Presently, we are – perhaps luckily – still in the so-called functional, ANI 
stage, given that most of the currently used AIs are hyper-specialized for 
the performance of certain tasks and lack general intelligence. 
2. AI-induced Labour Replacement
2.1. The Extent of Labour Replacement
16.  In the context of the labour-capital divide, AI (prima facie classified as cap-
ital, i.e., means of production29) will replace labour, the million-dollar ques-
tion being: to what extent? There are two opposing schools of thought in 
this regard: a so-called occupation-based approach and a so-called task-
based approach. Frey and Osborne are partisans of the former. In a study 
including 706 occupations from the Occupational Information Network 
(O*NET),30 Frey and Osborne predicted that 47% of these professions 
run the risk of total automation. However pivotal, this study was criticized 
because the authors seem to hold a monolithic view of occupations, per-
ceiving them as blocks of homogenous tasks rather than aggregates of 
tasks, with various degrees of AI-vulnerability. In subsequent studies we 
find a subtler approach, as focus is put on the possibility that certain tasks, 
as opposed to entire occupations, be exposed to AI-invasion. Estimates 
associated with the so-called task-based approach are less dramatic 
26 gurkaynak, yimaZ, Haksever, (2016), p. 751.
27 Ibidem.
28 Idem, p. 752. The remarkable progress made in AI triggered predictions that superintelligence may 
come about as soon as 2075. See müLLer, BOsTrOm, (2016), pp. 553-571. 
29 See, for example, TeinOsuke (2018), pp. 8. 
30 O*NET is a free online database of occupations classified according to a variety of criteria, available 
at: www.onetonline.org (10.05.2019).
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than those of the adherents to the occupation-based approach:31 14% 
of current occupations run a high risk of automation (between 50 and 
70%)32 with only a 5%33 risk of total automation.
17.  In light of these findings, agreement is reached on the point that total 
labour replacement will occur in routine-intensive occupations, which re-
quire minimal human adaptability and little in the way of formal training.34 
This is not very surprising. In previous industrial revolutions, new technol-
ogies have consistently contracted the demand for unqualified workers 
and increased the demand for qualified ones.35 The occupations argu-
ably most threatened by labour replacement are, thus, restaurant (fast-
food) work, factory work and agriculture.36 Alternatively, five groups of 
occupations are – also arguably – the least threatened by automation: 
care providers (doctors, nurses, etc.), professionals (engineers and sci-
entists), technology professionals (IT), builders (architects, surveyors), 
managers and executives, educators (childcare workers) and creatives 
(artists, performers).37 
18.  As negative as it may prima facie seem, AI-induced labour replacement 
is expected to produce two positive indirect effects: first, when a sector 
is automated, it will create strong, offsetting employment gains amongst 
downstream customer industries; second, the total factor productivi-
ty (TFP) growth in automated sectors will contribute to the aggregate 
growth in real value added, raising final demand, which in turn will con-
tribute to further employment growth across all sectors.38 This was the 
case in Europe: labour demand decreased by 9.6 million jobs as rou-
tine-replacing technologies were implemented in routine tasks.39 The 
product demand and local demand spillover effects, however, were pos-
itive and larger in absolute value, implying an increase in labour demand 
of 8.7 and 12.4 million jobs across Europe.40 
31 See neDeLkOska, QuinTini (2018), mckinsey gLOBaL insTiTuTe (2017).
32 neDeLkOska, QuinTini (2018), p. 12.
33 mckinsey gLOBaL insTiTuTe (2017), p. 5.
34 WisskircHen et al. (2017), pp. 15-17.
35 auTOr, saLOmOns, (2018), p. 11, auTOr, DOrn (2009), p. 50. 
36 frey, OsBOrne (2017), p. 261. In a study on the use of industrial robots, graeTZ and micHaeLs found that 
the substitution effect on overall employment stemming from the use of industrial robots is fairly minimal, 
affecting mostly low-skilled and, to a lesser extent, middle-skilled workers. See graeTZ, micHaeLs (2015), p. 21.
37 mckinsey gLOBaL insTiTuTe (2017).
38 Idem, p. 11.
39 gregOry, saLOmOns, ZieraHn (2016), p. 23.
40 Ibidem.
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19.  It should, however, be mentioned that the pace of automation will largely 
depend on two factors. First, businesses must be willing to integrate AIs 
in production and distribution processes: AIs will rapidly replace Human 
labour, only if the labour market, and the operators therein, are open to 
substituting labour with capital. Second, the shields raised by regula-
tion should not be disregarded: national, regional and global regulators 
are already pondering on the types of regulation that are best fitted for 
AI’s inception and reasonable and ethical use. These are, essentially, the 
contexts in which AI-induced labour displacement should be examined: 
the market context and the regulatory context.
2.2. The Context of Labour Replacement
20.  From a market perspective, there is little doubt that businesses will find 
intelligent systems to be attractive substitutes to Humans. The obvious 
reason is that the use of, say, robots is less expensive41 in comparison to 
the cost of Human workforce. One working hour costs the German au-
tomotive industry more than 40 euros, whereas the use of a robot, in the 
same industry, costs between 5 and 8 euros per hour, with the added 
advantage that a robot is able to work 24/7, does not require sick leave, 
will not get married and have children and will not ask for annual leave.42 
Drawing on this and other such experiences, regulators in developed 
countries have drafted AI Strategies which are generally favorable to an 
increased use of intelligent systems. Investments in the AI sector are a 
good indicator in this regard. In 2016, around 66% of all AI investments 
were made in the United States.43 In the EU, investments in robotics 
increased up to EUR 700 million between 2014 and 2020 and around 
EUR 1.1 billion were invested in AI-related research and innovation.44
21.  It should be stressed, however, that most studies on AI focus on devel-
oped countries.45 The global market for intelligent systems is far from 
being homogenous. For example, highly digitalized societies like South 
41 auTOr (2015), p. 11.
42 WisskircHen et al. (2017), p. 4. 
43 Finland’s Age of Artificial Intelligence. Turning Finland into a leading country in the application of 
artificial intelligence. Objective and recommendations for measures. Publications of the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs and Employment, 47/2017, available at: https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/han-
dle/10024/160391/TEMrap_47_2017_verkkojulkaisu.pdf (10.05.2019), p. 19.
44 COM(2018) 237 final, p. 1. 
45 WisskircHen et al. refer to the winners in the AI game. Referring to a 2016 World Economic Forum Re-
port, technically highly equipped countries like Switzerland, the Netherlands, Singapore, Qatar and the US 
are considered to be well prepared for the 4th industrial revolution. See WisskircHen et al. (2017), pp. 15-17.
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Korea and Japan will deal with AI-related labour replacement sooner 
than most developing countries, where industrialization – let alone au-
tomation – has not yet come to full bloom. Moreover, the demographic 
factors across world regions are different. Developed countries are likely 
to see a rise in aging workers whereas in developing countries, aging 
population in the labour market will decrease.46 
22.  Given that, for the time being, a regulatory statu quo is preferred, one 
must wonder if the basic employment concepts (employee, subordina-
tion and remuneration) are adaptable enough so that their scopes of ap-
plication extend to non-Human agents. The fundamental inquiry is: how 
comparable are AIs to Humans? The concept of autonomy, as a precon-
dition for intelligence, seems to play a key role, because it is the level of 
autonomy that determines how akin AI is or can be to a ‘real’ person. 
It is precisely through the prism of this concept that the possibility for a 
specific form of AI personhood and the extension of the ratione perso-
nae scope of the employee status to AIs will be considered hereafter.
3. Non-Human Agents as Employees
3.1. AIs as Persons
3.1.1. The Lack of Full Autonomy…
23.  Autonomy essentially translates as self-governance.47 In labour law, au-
tonomy is understood as power48 expressed in the worker’s decisional 
discretion. Indeed, the type and degree of workers’ autonomy is key in 
drawing the line between salaried and independent work. Independent 
workers enjoy greater freedom to ‘give their own law’, as they decide 
on the personal, substantial and temporal aspects of their work. With 
regard to employment, aspects such as the time, the place and the 
content of work are decided by the employer and are accepted by the 
employee, through the entering in an employment agreement. 
24.  In the context of AI, autonomy translates into an agent’s capacity to be 
autonomous, the main issue being if artificial agents can develop the 
46 See mckinsey gLOBaL insTiTuTe (2017), p. 59.
47 Etymologically, autonomy means to give oneself one’s own law. See THórissOn, HeLgassOn (2012), p. 3.
48 In political theory (which can be mutatis mutandis transposed to other social sciences), power can be 
defined as the capacity of an individual agent to secure preferences over those of others, or a structure of 
relations beyond the control of individuals. See rye (2015), p. 304.
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ability to attain a desired result without Human intervention. If AIs do, one 
day, achieve full autonomy, they will not fundamentally differ from Human 
workers, thus justifying a plea in favour of extending the personal scope 
of the employee status to non-Human agents. 
25.  Autonomy is a sign of intelligence. An agent is intelligent if she displays 
high levels of autonomy in situational awareness, cognition and inde-
pendent assessment.49 A washing machine has the autonomous ca-
pacity to wash a person’s clothes. Yet, it has never been suggested to 
view it as intelligent, due to its lack of broader awareness of its surround-
ings. It is not the mere presence of autonomy, but the kind of autono-
my that distinguishes intelligent from automated systems. Thórisson & 
Helgasson (2012) consider that the term ‘AI’ is “often used to refer to a 
system’s ability to operate without external (human) control. A washing 
machine, after started by a human operator, is clearly automatic from 
that point on (…) The meaning of autonomy in everyday language seems 
to require something above and beyond sophisticated automation.”50 
Automata “execute preprogrammed commands without any function-
ality for choosing or making decisions.”51 Intelligent systems’ autonomy 
resides in their capacity to recognize various circumstances and make a 
decision respectively.52 
26.  An artificial agent with general intelligence would possess full autonomy 
because she could rely on the available data for the purpose of taking 
action in a context not included in her initial programming.53 Such an 
agent would, indeed, possess four main attributes: real-time,54 referring 
to the ability to time-manage and strategize; learning,55 referring to the 
capacity to improve performance over time; resource management,56 
referring to the strategies required to deal with information overload; and 
meta-learning,57 referring to the ability to make changes.58 
49 ZaDeH et al. (2014), pp. 4ff. 
50 THórissOn, HeLgassOn (2012), p. 3. See also Huang (2008), p. 15.
51 ZaDeH et al. (2014), p. 4. 
52 Ibidem.
53 pennacHin, gOerTZeL (2007), p. 9. 
54 THórissOn, HeLgassOn (2012), p. 5. 
55 Ibidem. AI can learn in a supervised, unsupervised or reinforced manner, depending on the labelling of 
the data used at the programming stage. See WaLL (2018), p. 56.
56 WaLL (2018), p. 6.
57 Ibidem.
58 Our explanation of cognitive autonomy and the ability for assessment is voluntarily simplistic. The 
greater, underlying debate is that of knowledge construction which is a complex, multi-facetted debate. 
See Di iOriO (2015).
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27.  In light of the above, a chat-bot is different from a washing machine 
because it has some situational awareness (presupposing the ability for 
real-time language processing), but it remains limited to the scope of its 
labeled data. As AIs approach the AGI and Superintelligence stages, 
they may develop full autonomy as they will choose their own goals and 
the manner in which to achieve them.59 In the current, ANI stage of AI 
development, intelligent systems – albeit more sophisticated than their 
automatic cousins – display levels of autonomy that are still far behind 
those associated with fully self-governing agents such as Humans. It is, 
precisely, in relation to the degree of self-governance that some scholars 
have reflected on the issue of AI legal personhood.
3.1.2. … An Obstacle for the Recognition of AI Personhood
28.  For Kelsen (1967), “‘to be a person’ or ‘to have legal personality’ is identi-
cal with having legal obligations and subjective rights.”60 Legal personality 
is a fiction,61 the result of a normative choice of groups of subjects who 
are, in the eye of the law, capable of bearing various rights and duties. 
In this sense, a legal person is whoever the law designates as such:62 
enterprises and corporations are not creatures found in nature; they are 
constructs with Human, technical and economic resources employed for 
the purpose of attaining certain goals.63 Consequently, the attribution of a 
legal personality is a matter of a legislator’s discretion, which is not nec-
essarily required to reflect the natural order of things: companies (artificial 
creatures) are considered legal persons, whereas dogs (living beings) are 
assimilated to objects, namely from the viewpoint of liability. 
29.  AI personhood is a controversial issue. Economists agree that intelligent 
systems are means of production and should, as such, fall in the cate-
gory of capital. Available national case law on robots confirms this. For 
example, the issue in the Louis Marx & Co. and Gehrig Hoban & Co., 
Inc. v. United States case64 was whether an imported robot could be 
59 saripan et al. (2016), p. 824.
60 keLsen (1967), p. 172. See also Beran (2013), p. 30.
61 This is the so-called fiction theory. See, [XXX – ed. Comments] (1982), pp. 1645-1646. See also 
simmLer, markWaLDer (2019), p. 17.
62 smiTH (1928), p. 284.
63 In EU Competition law, for example, the term ‘undertaking’ is understood as designating an economic 
unit for the purpose of the subject-matter of the agreement in question even if in law that economic unit 
consists of several persons, natural or legal. See ECJ, 12 July 1984, Hydrotherm, 170/83, EU:C:1984:271.
64 40 Cust. Ct. 610, 610 (1958) cit. in caLO (2016), p. 14.
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viewed as an animate object. It was suggested, by the claimants, that 
the robot was “a synthetic man. It is something imitating men.”65 The 
court, however, disagreed and held that “a robot is a mechanical device 
or apparatus, a mere automation, that operates through scientific or me-
chanical media.”66 Since Louis Marx, the American Courts’ stance on 
robots has been consistent: they are devices, although they bear some 
likeness to Humans.67 A similar view seems to be upheld by the Europe-
ans. In a HERON Robotunits case,68 the notion of robot was defined as 
“any automated machine programmed to perform specific mechanical 
functions in the manner of a man.” The verdict is clear: robots are devic-
es that resemble Humans functionally, not ontologically. 
30.  Classifying AIs as objects (capital) presents the additional advantage of 
maintaining consistency with the ‘labour is not a commodity’ principle.69 
Indeed, to qualify AI as capital is to accept the latter’s commoditization, 
analogous to that of people in the context of slavery.70 In pre-industri-
al times, Human commoditization meant that entire economic systems 
depended on “multiple, simultaneous and overlapping forms of inequali-
ty”71 which labour law has sought to combat for the sake of Human dig-
nity. AI commoditization does not prima facie violate the principle of 
Human dignity, if AIs are viewed as commodities, deprived, as such, 
of any individuality and subjects to public or private ownership. In this 
sense, there is an advantage to classifying AIs as means of production 
because, in the context of standard economy, AIs fall in the category of 
financial rather than that of Human capital: the former is permissive to 
the exercise of ownership rights, the latter is not. As Merriman (2017) 
explains: “since the abolition of slavery, individuals are not owned assets 
65 Ibidem.
66 Idem, p. 15.
67 Similarly, in the Comptroller of the Treasury v. Family Entertainment Centres case, a Maryland spe-
cial appeals court had to decide whether life-sized, animatronic puppets that dance and sing at Chuckie 
Cheese restaurants trigger a state tax on food ‘where there is furnished a performance.’ The court found 
that a “preprogrammed robot can perform a menial task but, because a pre-programmed robot has no 
‘skill’ and therefore leaves no room for spontaneous human flaw in an exhibition, it cannot ‘perform’ a piece 
of music.” See Family Entertainment Centres of Essex, Inc. V. Comptroller of Treasury, 554 A.2d453 cit. in 
caLO (2016), p. 12.
68 Gen. Court, 26 November 2003, HERON Robotunits, T-222/02, EU:T:2003:315 (emphasis added).
69 In 19th-century political economy, markets were essentially seen as things of nature, determining suc-
cess, failure, wealth and poverty. Polanyi was critical of this view, arguing that “no society could stand 
the effects of such a system of crude fictions…unless its human…substance was protected.” See paTOn 
(2010), p. 82. See also supiOT (1994), p. 27.
70 BLackeTT (2011), p. 422.
71 Ibidem.
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in the traditional sense. Human assets are not controlled by the organi-
zation beyond the basic transactional exchange of services for pay. Hu-
man capital resides within and is owned by – and ultimately controlled 
by – the employee. Even when organizations invest in their employees 
to develop employee human capital, the employer is simply ‘renting’ the 
use of this human capital via the compensation paid to employees.”72
31.  Tackling the issue of AI personhood from the perspective of legal theory 
dictates a more nuanced approach. First, the inanimate nature of an 
entity does not preclude it from being a legal person. Enterprises, and 
even natural parks,73 have been attributed legal personalities, although 
they do not display any Human features. As already mentioned, Nature 
has very little to do with who is a legal person and who is not. According 
to Smith, no being or entity is inherently – or naturally – capable of hav-
ing and exercising rights. Legal personality is, therefore, not an issue of 
natural capacity, but an issue of interest-preservation.74
32.  Second, legal personhood includes several types of legal persons in 
terms of rights and duties. For example, non-emancipated minors are 
legal persons who, by virtue of a presumption of reduced capacity, can-
not exercise the right to enter into agreements, vote, get married, etc. 
One can imagine a legal status of AIs similar to that of children, implying 
that, should an AI cause a damage without Human involvement, it would 
be the person exercising a right of guardianship (owner, user or inceptor 
of the intelligent system) who would be held to repair it.75 It follows that: 
1. law does not a priori preclude AIs from having a legal personality on 
the grounds of their inanimate nature; 2. law does not a priori preclude 
AIs from benefitting from certain rights and duties, if it is necessary to 
safeguard some of their interests.76 
33.  There is, however, one capacity that may be of some importance when 
examining the issue of AI personhood: consciousness, understood as 
an agent’s awareness of the ethical consequences of her conduct.77
72 merriman (2017), p. 60.
73 sanDers (2018), pp. 207-234.
74 smiTH (1928), p. 284.
75 TA (2017)51, pt AD.
76 The ‘protection of interests’ theory on legal personhood has been confirmed in relation to certain 
procedural rights of animals. In 2015, a New York judge issued an order to show cause and writ of habeas 
corpus in favour of two chimpanzees who had been subject to biomedical experimentation. New York 
Supreme Court, 20 April 2015, The Nonhuman Rights Project INC vs Stony Brook University, Index N.º: 
152736/15.
77 This is the so-called missing-something argument. See sOLum (1992), p. 1264.
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34.  Ethical assessment as a prerequisite for the possession of legal person-
ality is debatable. From the viewpoint of positive law, ethics is not impor-
tant. However, ethical assessment is linked to the notion of autonomy 
in so far as it relates to the agent’s capacity for independent reasoning. 
This is why we have the doli incapax exception in criminal law, based 
on the presumption that minors below a certain age do not have a full 
capacity to fully grasp the consequences of their actions.78 The estab-
lishment of causation in criminal matters presupposes that if an agent 
committed a free, deliberate and informed action or omission, she knew, 
or should have known, of the potential consequences of her actions 
and that there were no other factors intervening in the occurrence of 
those consequences.79 Intention is key in criminal law. It presupposes 
that there be an agent capable of independently exercising her will in 
accordance (or not) with a basic ethical code of conduct. This is not yet 
the case with AIs. 
35.  An example cited by Turner (2019)80 is interesting in this regard: in ancient 
Athens, a statue was pushed off its pedestal and, as it fell, it crushed 
one person. The statue was then tried, found guilty and, as punishment, 
pushed into the sea.81 This case is comical because the defendant was 
entirely unaware of the damage caused, the trial itself and the gravity 
of the punishment. A similar comical sentiment would be triggered in a 
case where a Tesla car, having caused the death of a person,82 was put 
on trial and burnt as punishment, if an algorithm, having caused millions 
of dollars’ worth of losses through algo-trading, was shut down or if 
Amazon’s HR algorithm was found guilty of gender discrimination and 
was also shut down.83 
36.  Alternatively, should we consider that sexbots not having consented to 
intercourse with Humans are victims of rape?84 Should those Humans be 
tried and, if found guilty, punished?… The ethical choices this and other 
such issues imply are not easy. Suffice it to say that, for the time be-
ing, intelligent systems essentially follow orders and do not exercise fully 
78 saripan et al. (2016), p. 827. 
79 Turner (2019), p. 60. 
80 Ibidem.
81 Idem, p. 50.
82 See https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/31/tesla-car-crash-autopilot-moun-
tain-view (10.05.2019).
83 See https://mashable.com/article/amazon-sexist-recruiting-algorithm-gender-bias-ai/?europe=true 
(10.05.2019).
84 See guTiu (2016).
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independent bias. Any biases they may display invariably come – or are 
presumed to come – from the Humans involved in their programming.85 
37.  This being said, if one day, Superintelligent AI comes about, the issue 
of AI legal personhood may be considered more seriously. It is difficult 
to predict how new technologies will evolve and how law, society and 
economy will respond. As Turner (2019) put it, “whether it is a ques-
tion of determining liability for harm or responsibility for beneficial events, 
causation is not simply a question of objective fact but rather of econom-
ic, social and legal policy. The analysis encompasses, whether overtly or 
covertly, judgments about what types of behavior we want to promote 
or discourage, as well as issues of justice and distribution. Seen in this 
light, it should become clear that seeking human behind every AI act is 
just one of many policy responses that could be chosen.”86 
38.  It is interesting to note how, on the issue of legal personhood, AIs raise 
a mirror on our own misconceptions on the relation between legal and 
natural capacity. It turns out that intelligence (as an umbrella concept 
that includes ethics) is, in fact, an implicit and, ultimately decisive, crite-
rion for being a legal subject. To a large extent, AIs cannot be legal per-
sons because they are prisoners of their own hyper-specialization, with 
a limited ability to make ethical choices or be aware that their choices 
may have ethical repercussions. The currently usable AIs are, therefore, 
idiot-savants, “very good at one narrow task and useless for anything 
else, even tasks very similar to the one they were designed for.”87 Their 
lack of general intelligence – and therefore full autonomy – is precisely 
what precludes AIs from being included in the employee status because, 
in their quality of hyper-specialized, idiot-savant devices, they not only 
lack the ability to assess how their actions affect others, but also the 
ability to express how they, themselves, wish to be treated; a feature 
that is recommended when an employee is getting ready to sign an 
employment contract.
3.2. AIs as Employees
39.  In principle, employment should be established willingly. The employ-
ment relationship “conceals the pattern of mutual expectation between 
the employee and employer that does not (completely) reveal itself 
85 Hacker (2018), p. 1144.
86 guTiu (2016), p. 63.
87 paisner, cOx, maynOrD (2014), p. 2085.
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through formal agreements and express contract terms.”88 Although, 
in an employment agreement, the contracting parties are not on equal 
footing – the employee being inferior to the employer in terms of power 
of decision and economic means – it is important that the worker enter 
in an employment contract voluntarily. The voluntary establishment of 
employment expresses a basic contract law principle: a party must free-
ly give consent, with clear knowledge of the terms of contract and the 
obligations that flow from the latter.89 
40.  As already mentioned, the concept of employment was challenged by 
some recent tendencies in the labour market. Platform economy and, 
more generally, atypical work, rely on increasingly complex contractu-
al arrangements,90 making it difficult to maintain the traditional binary 
view of work as being either salaried or independent.91 Atypical work is 
‘atypical’ namely because the unitary vision of the employer is no longer 
sustainable. Modern work-settings do, indeed, include multiple levels 
of control, making it difficult to determine where the decisional power 
preponderantly lies. Observing the difficulty to maintain the conceptual 
uniformity of the notion of employer, prassL (2016) suggested a five-step 
test for the purpose of determining if an entity acts as an employer func-
tionally as opposed to formally.92 
41.  It is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the so-called fissuring93 – as 
a mantra chanted by contemporary labour lawyers – of fundamental la-
bour law concepts such as that of employer, two things were considered 
as established: first, online platforms did not eradicate the Human ele-
ment. Although work may be performed through such platforms, there 
was never really any doubt that the agents actually doing the work would 
be Human. Second, the capacity of the atypical workers to enter in con-
tractual relations with platforms and consumers was seldom brought 
88 van Bever (2012), p. 177. 
89 Many national provisions on employment put the emphasis on the voluntary entry in an employment 
relationship. In Spain, see Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2015, ‘BOE’ n.º 255, de 24/10/2015, art. 1(1). See 
also Art. 3 of the Belgian Loi relative aux contrats de travail of 3 July 1978, available at: www.ejustice.just.
fgov.be/loi/loi.htm (10.05.2019). 
90 In the context of crowd work, prassL and risak analysed the so-called three-sided contracts, involving 
the crowsdsourcer, the platform and the crowd, in an attempt to identify the contractual relations in such 
contexts and give them the proper legal classification. See prassL, risak (2016), p. 628.
91 See European Commission Green Paper, Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century, COM(2006) 708 final, p. 10. See also meier (2014). For the main labour law issues raised in relation 
to the online platforms, see De sTefanO (2016). 
92 See prassL, risak (2016), p. 636. For an in-depth study of the so-called functional approach in defining 
the notion of employer, see prassL (2015).
93 See esTLunD (2018), p. 302. 
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into question: a person who works as an Uber driver is presumed to 
have voluntarily entered in a contractual relationship with the Uber plat-
form. In other words, the capacity of workers to agree to various work 
arrangements, as atypical as they may be, was rarely, if ever, cause for 
doubt.
42.  The issue of capacity is central in the context of automated labour be-
cause, as already argued, AIs are not fully autonomous agents and 
cannot, from today’s perspective, make a claim for a form of legal 
personhood. There are, of course, some cases dealing with Human-
oid robots treated as Humans. For example, in 2017, the robot Sophia 
acquired the nationality of Saudi Arabia,94 thus rebutting – circumstan-
tially rather than universally – the assumption that only Humans can be 
considered as a country’s nationals. In 2018, a headline of a Finestra 
article read “HSBC hires Pepper the robot”,95 the key word being “hires”. 
Pepper performs the job of a low-level bank clerk. It greets customers 
and offers basic information relating to ATMs, online apps, self-service 
and customer support. When presented with more complex demands, 
Pepper notifies its human colleagues.96 
43.  Pepper is not HSBC’s in-house developed robot. HSBC did not hire 
Pepper (the robot didn’t interview with the bank’s HR nor did it sign a 
contract); rather, HSBC purchased Pepper, thus proving the historically 
consistent view97 that robots are objects as opposed to agents. The 
Pepper example shows that, from a legal point of view, there isn’t – for-
mally speaking – a difference between a robot and a printer. Both are 
seen as means of production. Although the robot is more sophisticated 
(intelligent) than the printer, it does not yet possess the level of autonomy 
that would allow it to leave the category of automata and join the catego-
ry of Human-like (because more generally intelligent) systems.
44.  The Pepper example does, however, constitute a prelude to the mixity 
(AI-Human) that will, most probably, be the dominant work model in the 
future: intelligent systems’ main purpose will be to assist Humans (and 
therefore be Intelligence Assisting98); when they reach the limits of what 
they are programmed to do, Humans will intervene. The prophecies on 
94 See https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-grants-citizenship-to-robot-sophia/a-41150856 (10.05.2019).
95 See https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/32314/hsbc-hires-pepper-the-robot (10.05.2019).
96 Ibidem.
97 caLO (2016), p. 27.
98 This is a suggestion in kOrinek, sTigLiTZ (2017), p. 3.
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labour replacement voiced by economists99 prove to be, if not absolutely 
accurate, at least highly plausible: Human intervention will be needed 
in problem solving and creative thinking; simple and repetitive tasks will 
be left to intelligent systems. The so-called cobots (collaborative robots) 
are already becoming prominent in sectors like the food industry, the car 
industry, agriculture and medicine. 
45.  The same observation can be made for AIs that do not have physical 
support like robots. In fact, most intelligent systems take the form of ap-
plications, web-sites or platforms that do, indeed, perform certain tasks 
autonomously but are, above all, designed to help Humans. Research is, 
presently, the activity at which intelligent systems excel because they are 
faster, more efficient and make less errors than people.100 International 
businesses are already using AIs, namely, for the purpose of market re-
search. In the field of algorithmic trading, for example, algorithms make 
decisions based on market data and programmed orders to achieve 
certain results. Quantopian101 is a crowd-sourced investment firm that 
gives people the possibility to write investment algorithms while pro-
viding capital, education, data, research environment and development 
platform. Blackrock’s Aladdin102 is an operating system that provides 
businesses with information on investment helping them to make faster 
and more efficient decisions.103 
46.  These examples illustrate that AIs are, essentially, non-human, high-per-
forming assistants who facilitate the provision of various services; they 
are the artificial extensions of those who use them. Consequently, while 
we may expect that AIs change the content and the organization of 
work, they are not likely to affect the personal scope of application of the 
employee status. In a sense, AI’s impact on labour is not fundamentally 
different from that of computers:104 the major changes will concern how 
work is done, not who is getting paid to do it. 
47.  Suppose, however, that the robot Pepper is further developed and may, 
at some point, pass the Turing test.105 According to some predictions, 
99 See neDeLkOska, QuinTini (2018).
100 For example, for the purpose of Legal Research, magistrates, law firms and researchers use ROSS: 
www.rossintelligence.com (10.05.2019).
101 See www.quantopian.com (10.05.2019).
102 See www.blackrock.com/aladdin/offerings/aladdin-overview (10.05.2019).
103 See https://www.blackrock.com/aladdin/benefits/risk-managers (10.05.2019).
104 See auTOr (2015), p. 11.
105 See DanZieg (2018), pp. 158-174.
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Superintelligence may come about as soon as 2075.106 If we do, one 
day, reach the stage of Superintelligent humanoid robots (i.e., robots 
that surpass Humans in all areas), we may then reconsider the possibility 
of a specific category of non-human employees. The time is, alas, not 
ripe.
4. AIs and the Criterion of Subordination 
4.1. Control over AI 
48.  The zeitgeist in recent years included the new ways in which employers 
could exercise control over their employees.107 The extensive literature in 
this regard will not be examined here. Suffice it to say that the troubling 
aspect, in the context of standard labour law, was the emerging of new 
types of indirect control that employers could exercise over workers. 
49.  The operative concept in relation to the notion of subordination is – yet 
again – that of autonomy. Subordination has been traditionally defined 
as control and direction of the worker by the employer. This ‘hierarchical 
power’ includes the ability to give orders, to control the execution thereof 
and to sanction cases of non- or ill-execution. Scholars have correlated 
the extent of scrutiny over the employees with the type (blue-collar or 
white-collar) of occupation: “while blue-collar workers usually have low 
control over the work environment, more skilled workers have significant 
autonomy on determining the pace and organization of work, particular-
ly as technological advancements and greater specialization have hin-
dered employers from closely supervising the performance of work.”108 
50.  Assuming that most blue-collar occupations will be entirely automated 
in the upcoming decades, will there still be a need to exercise personal 
scrutiny over the intelligent systems who will replace the workers? The 
answer is prima facie negative. Although Humans may be in positions of 
command and control,109 the Human-AI relationship is not one of hierar-
chy of one person over another, since AIs are viewed as commodities. 
51.  Curious scenarios may, however, arise as shown in the Columbus-Amer-
ica Discovery Group, Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned 
106 See müLLer, BOsTrOm (2016).
107 See, for example, prassL, risak (2016), p. 628.
108  Ibidem.
109 See DaviDOv (2017).
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Vessel, S.S. Central America110. In the 1980s, robots were used in the 
search for a ship sunk in the Atlantic Ocean some 150 years prior. 
A treasure was found in the ship’s remains, raising the issue of whether 
the explorers from the Columbus-American Discovery Group could gain 
custody, control and possession of the finds, even though they did not 
directly make the discovery. The US court found that, sending robots 
in lieu of divers was enough to confirm the presence of Human control 
and possession, because the robots performed tasks and were “able 
to generate live images of the wreck and had the further ‘capability to 
manipulate the environment’ at the direction of people.”111 This case es-
tablished what later became known as the test for telepossession which 
includes four steps for determining if a robot acts in an autonomous or 
a controlled manner. These steps are: “(1) locating the wreckage, (2) 
real-time imaging, (3) placement of a robot near the wreckage with the 
ability to manipulate objects therein, and [most importantly] (4) intent to 
exercise control.”112 
52.  Human control (or direction) is key. Although the robot involved in the 
treasure hunt performed some basic activities autonomously, it was di-
rected – or irrefutably presumed to have been directed – by people at 
all times. One may argue that this presumption is a symptom of our 
collective mental barrier on perceiving intelligent systems as something 
other than automata. Certainly, the future may push us to go past this 
mental stalemate:113 suppose a robot was used for scientific exploration 
of shipwrecks on the sea floor but it stumbled upon entirely new species 
of sea flora or fauna. This scenario is interesting because, unlike the Co-
lumbus-America case, the intention of the Humans-in-control would be 
one (exploring ship-wrecks) and the discovery made by the robot would 
be another (e.g., a new species of fish). The robot would not per se be 
directed to make the discovery, implying the absence of direct Human 
intent to exercise control (i.e., the fourth requirement of the teleposses-
sion test). 
53.  Who would then be entitled to a right of custody, control and posses-
sion? The issue of AI legal personhood re-emerges. A pro-AI person-
hood argument would be that, in a case where Human intention is 
clearly absent and a robot makes unexpected gains, the Human-robot 
relationship should be assimilated to that between an employer and an 
110 1989 A.M.C. 1955 (1989) cit. in caLO (2016), p. 17.
111 Idem, p. 18, emphasis added.
112 Ibidem.
113 Idem, p. 19.
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employee. In research and development companies – depending on 
world regions – the employers get the intellectual property and future 
profits from the employees’ inventions and innovations. In our example, 
while the Humans-in-control could ultimately benefit from that discovery, 
the robot would be entitled to some credit. In other words, there may be 
circumstances, such as the ‘unexpected gains’ scenario, that may en-
courage us to ponder on whether the, today irrefutable, presumption of 
Human direction, can or should be rebutted. Here again, our inclination 
is to give a negative response for one, fairly simple reason: while robots 
may, indeed, accidentally make a groundbreaking discovery, it is the Hu-
mans supervising the robot who would recognize the magnitude of the 
discovery made. The consciousness factor thus reappears: unless a ro-
bot was programmed to identify that a certain species is new, it will fail to 
do so; the Humans in charge of the robot, however, will be able to assess 
the importance of the discovery that the robot would remain unaware 
of. The implication here is that, from the viewpoint of subordination, in 
the sense of labour law, the control that people (owners and/or users of 
AIs) exercise over AIs continues to derive from a right of ownership and/
or use, not from an agreed upon, personal relationship between an em-
ployer and an employee. In other words, AIs remain commodities and, as 
such, cannot the object of employers’ supervision. This being said, they 
may be the means through which this supervision is performed. 
4.2. Control through AI 
54.  Some intelligent systems have functionalities that allow for the meas-
uring of one’s daily activities and inferring one’s levels of productivity. 
This modern, automated way of scrutinizing employees may be salut-
ed as a step forward and away from the traditional, personal scrutiny 
of employers. However, modernity is not risk-free as some aspects of 
the AI-assisted monitoring continue to raise serious questions. How can 
performance be measured and, more importantly, how can an intelli-
gent system be programmed to measure it? Examples of systems like 
ISAAC,114 currently used by international businesses, can provide some 
clarity in this regard.115 
114  See www.statustoday.com (10.05.2019). Another example is the ‘knowyourday’ software (www.
knowyourday.ai, 10.05.2019).
115 According to a Gartner survey, more than 50% of companies with a turnover above $750 million use 
digital data-gathering tools to monitor employee activities and performance. See: https://www.forbes.com/
sites/bernardmarr/2019/05/29/artificial-intelligence-in-the-workplace-how-ai-is-transforming-your-em-
ployee-experience/ (10.05.2019).
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55.  ISAAC is an intelligent system that, not only measures certain parame-
ters relative to work performance (the most obvious being the time spent 
in front of a computer) but also builds a comprehensive image of the 
employees’ profile.116 While ISAAC and other such systems can provide 
data that may, indeed, be used for the purpose of better employee man-
agement, there is an obvious risk of an AI ‘going too far’ in scrutinizing a 
worker and, perhaps, misrepresenting her actual performance.
56.  On a personal level, AI monitoring may gravely affect the employees’ 
psychological health: “people are deemed not to be working if they take 
their hands off the keyboard for five minutes. But they could be thinking, 
and that doesn’t get measured. What is this doing for innovation, which 
needs creative workers?”117 When monitored by AIs, employees feel a 
constant pressure because they know they are being monitored, but do 
not know what is the content of the data being processed. 
57.  From a European perspective, this opaque, Orwellian scrutiny is prob-
lematic in relation to privacy and Data protection. The European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) – having considered that the notion of private 
life encompasses activities of professional and business nature118 – ruled 
that telephone, e-mail and Internet usage at work are covered by Article 
8 ECtHR.119 An employee’s electronic communication accessed by the 
employer cannot be grounds for the former’s dismissal120 and, when the 
employer is habilitated to verify the employee’s private use of a compa-
ny’s item (like a PC), she must not overstep the margin of appreciation 
available to her.121 
58.  In a context where employees are monitored by an intelligent system 
without prior indication of the type and content of the monitored data, the 
issue of reasonable expectations arises. In a work setting, the question 
is that of the conduct that an employee can reasonably expect to be the 
object of the employer’s monitoring.122 It was established in the Halford 
116 For example, ISAAC identifies the so-called central workers, in charge of holding the network togeth-
er; the knowledge brokers, perceived as critical connections to external knowledge, and the peripheral 
workers who present the risk of exiting.
117 Article in The Guardian, 7 August 2019, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/
apr/07/uk-businesses-using-artifical-intelligence-to-monitor-staff-activity (10.05.2019).
118 ECtHR, 16 December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany, App. N.º 13710/88, § 29.
119 ECtHR, 25 June 1997, Halford v. UK, Appp. N.º 20605/92, ECtHR, 3 April 2007, Copland v. UK, App. 
N.º 62617/00.
120 ECTHR, 5 September 2017, Barbulescu v. Romania, App. N.º 61496/08.
121 ECtHR, 22 February 2018, Libert v. France, App. N.º 588/13.
122 In the US, the reasonable expectations doctrine originated in the Katz v US case. See, Katz v US, n.º 
35 (1967), p. 361.
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case123 that, without a warning that calls are intercepted, a person may 
have reasonable expectation as to the privacy of such calls.124 In the 
Copland case,125 the same expectation extended to e-mail and Internet 
usage.126 In light of this case law, an employer would be precluded from 
using ISACC to process, say, e-mails exchanged between co-workers 
in which they criticize their superiors. If there is no warning from the 
employer that communications between colleagues are scrutinized, the 
employees could reasonably expect that their private exchange in the 
workplace remains private.
59.  The reasonable expectations doctrine expresses a traditional conun-
drum in privacy matters i.e., the tracing of the limits on the intrusions in 
a person’s private life. Under the ECtHR, any access to, and processing 
of, personal data must comply with three main requirements, namely: le-
gality, meaning that a domestic law must indicate with reasonable clarity 
the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on 
the public authorities;127 the pursuit of legitimate aims, such as the pre-
vention of crime through the disclosure of certain types of data;128 and 
proportionality. Similar requirements are found in EU law. As per Article 
52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter), the limitations on 
the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by the Charter must 
be provided for by law, respect the essence of the right to data protec-
tion, meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality129 and meet 
the objectives of general interest recognized by the EU or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others.130 
60.  One increasingly important aspect, expressed in Art. 52(1) of the Charter, 
is data protection, governed by the General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR).131 The use of a system such as ISAAC for the purpose of 
monitoring a company’s employees qualifies as data processing, within 
123 ECtHR, 25 June1997, Halford v. UK, App. N.º 20605/92. 
124 Idem, § 45.
125 ECtHR, 3 April 2007, Copland v UK, App. N.º 62617/00, § 42.
126 Idem, § 42.
127 ECtHR, 4 May 2000, Rotaru v. Romania, App. N.º 28341/95, § 61.
128 ECtHR, 28 January 2003, Peck v. UK, App. N.º 44647/98.
129  ECJ, 9 November 2010, Schecke and Eifert, C-92/09 and C-93/09, EU:C:2010:662.
130  ECJ, 17 October 2013, Schwarz, C-291/12, EU:C:2013:670.
131  There are other regional and international instruments on Data Protection such as the Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 28 January 1981, ETC 
N.º 108 and UN General Assembly, 18 December 204, The Right to Privacy in a Digital Age, A/73/589/
Add.2 DR XVII. In this study, we shall focus on the GDPR. 
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the meaning of the GDPR.132 The company using ISAAC qualifies as a 
controller, in so far as it determines the purposes and means of the pro-
cessing of personal data.133 In this context, the general requirements on 
data processing, set out in Article 5 GDPR,134 could apply in the context 
of AI employee monitoring. We shall not proceed to a detailed study of 
all said requirements; we shall only focus on two, interrelated aspects: 
lawfulness and transparency. 
61.  One of the key requirements for data processing to be considered lawful 
is the expression of consent from the data subject.135 Consent should be 
given freely and explicitly (written declaration)136 and can be withdrawn 
at any time.137 In view of soliciting the subjects’ consent, the processor 
is held to observe the principle of transparency: the data subjects must 
receive clear and intelligible information on why the data are processed.138 
Any information and communication relating to the processing of per-
sonal data should be “easily accessible and easy to understand, and 
that clear and plain language be used.”139
62.  The principle of transparency concerns, in particular, “information to 
the data subjects on the identity of the controller and the purposes of 
the processing and further information to ensure fair and transparent 
processing in respect of the natural persons concerned and their right 
to obtain confirmation and communication of personal data concern-
ing them which are being processed.”140 Moreover, the data subjects 
“should be made aware of risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation 
to the processing of personal data and how to exercise their rights in 
relation to such processing. In particular, the specific purposes for which 
personal data are processed should be explicit and legitimate and deter-
mined at the time of the collection of the personal data.”141
132 Art. 4 (2) GDPR.
133  Art. 4(7) GDPR. If a company uses an AI to monitor the employees of another company, it acts as 
a processor, defined as a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller (Art. 4(8) GDPR).
134  These principles include lawfulness (art. 5-a), specific, explicit and legitimate purposes to the data 
collection (art. 5-b), data minimization, essentially translating to the respect of the principle of necessity (art. 
5-c), accuracy (art. 5-d), data storage (art. 5-e), security (art. 5-f).
135 Art. 6 GDPR.
136 Art. 7(2) GDPR.
137 Art. 7(4) GDPR.
138 Art. 7(3) GDPR.
139 Rec. 39, GDPR.
140 Ibidem.
141 Ibidem.
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63.  It follows that, not only should monitored employees be informed of the 
content of the intended data processing, but they should also be able to 
access the data collected and disclosed to their employer.142 
64.  Moreover, the monitored employees could rely on Articles 21 and 22 
GDPR.143 On the grounds of Article 21(1) GDPR, the employee can ob-
ject, at any time, to automated individual decision-making, forcing the 
employer to no longer process the personal data unless there is “com-
pelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the inter-
ests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, 
exercise or defense of legal claims.” Article 22(1) GDPR stipulates that 
a data subject has the right not to be subject to a decision based on 
automated processing, including profiling, “which produces legal effects 
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.” This 
provision does not apply when the automated decision “is necessary for 
entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject 
and a data controller.”144 In an employment context, and given the case 
law of the European Courts on the data that can actually be collected 
and processed by employers in relation to the right to privacy, it remains 
to be seen how the exceptions set out in Article 22(2) GDPR will be 
interpreted in the future. Future case law will hopefully shed more light 
on what can be considered as a necessary automated decision for the 
purpose of executing an employment contract.145
65.  Of course, the inceptors and users of ISAAC may argue that the use 
of intelligent systems also allows for the enhancement of the employ-
ees’ well-being and protection. Indeed, ISAAC is able to determine if 
an employee is overworked through detecting if she is working in the 
evenings or on weekends, thus giving her employer the possibility to 
better comply with any legal requirements on working time. However, 
notwithstanding the uses of AI monitoring that may reinforce employees’ 
protection (against burn out for example), such use must not be done in 
violation of the basic principles on data processing and data protection.
66.  The conclusion that can be drawn here includes an observation on the cur-
rent state of automated employee monitoring and a remark on its future. 
142 ECJ, 7 May 2009, Rijkeboer, C-553/07, EU:C:2009:293. In the context of the ECtHR, see ECtHR, 24 
August 2011, K.H. et al. V. Slovakia, App. N.º 32881/04, §§ 46 seq.
143 See OTTO (2019).
144 Art. 22(2)(b) GDPR.
145  See HenDrickx (2019), p. 384. This is an example of a case of entering in a contract. However, the 
interpretation of the criterion of necessity within the meaning of Art. 22(2) GDPR is yet to be clarified in legal 
practice and case law.
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At present, companies that monitor their employees through the use of 
artificial systems seem to hold their employees in a state of anxiety-pro-
voking ignorance as regards the type of personal data collected and as-
sessed. Merely informing an employee of automated monitoring is not the 
same as formally acquiring her consent for such monitoring to take place. 
In the future, improvements are needed regarding transparency, namely 
for the purpose of determining that the processed employees’ data are 
strictly linked to the work performance and do not include data on the em-
ployees’ racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, or trade union membership, genetic data, health or the worker’s 
sex life or sexual orientation.146 Moreover, there are some doubts on the 
fact of letting an intelligent system be the sole judge of a Human worker’s 
performance. AIs will, no doubt, facilitate the monitoring for employers, 
but will not discharge them entirely from taking a more personal interest 
in their employees’ performance and well-being.147 Hopefully, most future 
employers will view work as being something other than time spent typing: 
work periods spent in meetings, thinking and brain-storming, interacting 
with colleagues and superiors and break periods are just as important as 
the periods when one is glued to one’s computer screen.
5. The Obsolescence of Remuneration?
67.  Remuneration is a traditional classifier of employment: the entity or agent 
acting as employer is legally and contractually bound to compensate 
her workers for their efforts.148 Remuneration sanctions the economic 
character of the salaried activity for both the worker and the employer. 
For the employee, it serves the purpose of subsistence and takes the 
form of monetary compensation although, in some cases, it may also be 
in kind.149 For businesses acting as employers, salary costs are incurred 
so that the activity they pursue ultimately produces profit. 
146  Art. 9(1) GDPR. Exceptions to the principle set out in this provision are stipulated in art. 9(2) GDPR.
147  HenDrickx speaks of right to Human interaction. See HenDrickx (2019), p. 385.
148 See, for example, Spanish Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2015, cit. supra, Art. 26-1(1); Articles L3241-1 
to L3245-1 of the French Labour Code. In EU law, a person can qualify as a migrant worker within the 
meaning of Art. 45 TFEU if she provides services, under the supervision of another person and for remu-
neration. See ECJ, 3 July 1986, Lawrie Blum, 66/85, EU:C:1986:284, § 17.
149 In EU law, see, for example,. ECJ, 7 September 2004, Trojani, C-456/02, EU:C:2004:488. See also 
Spanish Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2015, cit. supra, Art. 26-1(1), in Belgium, Art. 6 of Loi concernant la 
protection de la rémunération des travailleurs, 12 April 1965, available at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/
cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?cn=1965041204&la=F&language=fr&table_name=loi.
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68.  In this context, if AIs present the prospect of reducing salary costs (i.e., 
the number of paid workers) while increasing productivity, businesses 
will not hesitate in replacing Human workers with intelligent systems. 
The four Hicks-Marshall Laws of Derived Demand150 confirm this ob-
servation. The AI-to-Human substitution in routine-intensive professions 
is very likely because: 1. the price elasticity of demand for a product is 
high; 2. the means of production (the AIs) can be easily substituted for 
labour; 3. the supply of other means of production is highly elastic and 
4. the cost of employing the category of labour is a large share of the 
total costs of production.151 In sum, if companies – being the rational 
economic agents that they are152 – can substitute human labour with 
more cost-effective means of production, they will! 
69.  Notwithstanding the fact that economically, AIs are very attractive com-
modities for businesses, their increased use will also translate into the 
fact that the Human workers replaced by AIs will no longer be able to rely 
on their work for sustenance. Technological unemployment will be on 
the rise although some economists have sent messages of encourage-
ment in that: 1. said unemployment will be temporary and will reduce as 
the number of highly qualified workers increases; 2. AI-induced labour 
replacement will not be total, Humans will continue to be present (and, 
in some sectors, prevalent) in the labour market and will continue to re-
ceive remuneration for their work. As long as there are Human workers 
in the labour market, remuneration will be maintained, serving its original 
purpose namely, subsistence. 
70.  In a future, highly automated labour market, the issue that may arise – 
and that is already studied by some scholars – is that of compensating 
robots for their work. The notion of remuneration would then be funda-
mentally affected because the purpose of subsistence would be out of 
the equation: robots (and other AIs) do not need remuneration to live, 
pay rent, buy food, support a family, etc. What would, then, be the point 
of paying wages? However understandable, this position can be seen as 
deeply upsetting with regard to the principle of redistribution of resourc-
es. In an entirely automated market, companies would maximize profits 
while bringing salary costs close to zero. Eliminating salary costs in such 
a way would translate into reducing the employers’ social contributions 
causing Social Security Schemes considerable losses in revenues. 
150 See cHirinkO, maLLick (2006).
151 eHrenBerg, smiTH (2006), p. 97. 
152  Rationality of economic operators is, indeed, the fundamental assumption in standard economy. See, 
for example, rOBinsOn (1969), p. 15.
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71.  In an attempt to reconcile market rationality (businesses should use AIs 
to realize profits) and social justice (businesses in automated sectors 
should continue contributing to Social Security Schemes) some have 
suggested the creation of the so-called robot tax. Oberson (2017) tied 
the latter to the right of ownership.153 An enterprise using a robot, as-
similated to movable property, would pay a tax, the amount of which 
would be equivalent to the assumed leasable amount of the robot per 
month. This would generate a continuous stream of revenues that could 
then be used by regulators to finance Social Security Schemes such as 
unemployment benefits. The robot tax is an interesting proposition as it 
essentially suggests the creation of a specific type of wage that could, 
indeed, be one of the possible sources for financing Social Security ben-
efits, namely unemployment benefits. 
72.  Of course, in order for the robot tax to be seriously considered, automa-
tion of the labour market should attain a relatively high level. If one ima-
gines that one day, the labour market will be entirely automated, there 
would be no human workers left to receive salaries. How should their 
subsistence be guaranteed then? Some scholars are toying with the 
idea of Universal Basic Income (UBI). 
73.  Unlike the robot tax, as a revenue that compensates work, but does 
not serve subsistence, UBI is a revenue that is not compensatory, but 
aims at guaranteeing the beneficiaries’ subsistence. The creation of UBI 
implies a major paradigm shift: subsistence would no longer be the pur-
pose of labour, it would become a universal right.154
74.  According to Van Parijs (2017), UBI would be an income paid to all, 
regardless of their professional status, social status, living situation and 
place of residence.155 UBI is tempting because it relies on resource 
equality, uncoditionality and universality. These traits are, in fact, char-
acteristics of the three main allocation modes: UBI would be a resource 
aimed at ensuring subsistence, allocated universally, i.e., regardless of a 
person’s individual status, and would not be a compensation for efforts 
made. 
75.  However attractive, the idea of UBI is – from today’s perspective – 
farfetched for two, very practical reasons. First, how should UBI be 
financed? A robot tax is one option. However, in order for a Social Se-
curity system to support the subsistence of potentially large numbers 
of persons, there would have to be a more substantial redesigning of 
153 OBersOn (2017). 
154  See nicOLe-DrancOurT (2013).
155 See van parijs, vanDerBOrgHT (2017).
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a country’s Social Security Scheme and Tax System. UBI adversaries 
claim that UBI would increase public spending while entailing losses in 
tax revenue. There are, however, those who suggest that a rob-Peter-to-
pay-Paul approach may not be as costly as it may seem. In his study of 
the Canadian social welfare system, Pereira (2017) argues that a smarter 
approach in designing already existing Social Security Schemes may 
actually lead to increased public gains: UBI would present new saving 
possibilities, it would not require the raising of taxes to unacceptable 
levels; bureaucratic costs would be reduced and sources other than 
income would be used for UBI financing, if required.156
76.  The second practical issue is the amount of UBI. The purpose of resource 
equality is certainly not to bring people down to the line of poverty, but 
to ensure a decent lifestyle… Whatever ‘decent’ means. There is some 
danger in letting public regulators decide on the amount presumed to 
ensure people’s suitable subsistence which would, at the same time, not 
dissuade them from seeking employment in view of earning higher reve-
nues.157 This debate remains open. In Finland, there was a test group of 
1.500 people who received a monthly revenue of EUR 550, in addition 
to other social benefits. If a person found employment, her income was 
subject to a higher tax (43%) aimed at compensating for the fact that, for 
a given period of time, that person was a UBI beneficiary. 
77.  Although scholars and regulators should further reflect on the best 
means and methods for guaranteeing that the workers of tomorrow will 
have some level of base-line security,158 UBI will most probably not be a 
first-choice solution to automation because, as already mentioned, the 
labour market will not be entirely automated any time soon; work will 
continue to be done, in large part, by Human workers. In this context, 
remuneration will continue: 1. to be perceived by Human workers, 2. to 
serve the purpose of subsistence, 3. to compensate work performance.
6. Concluding Remarks
78.  Two series of conclusions can be drawn from the arguments presented: 
one dealing with AI’s effect on labour law, the other dealing with AI’s 
effect on labour policy.
156  pereira (2017).
157 mOnTi, feDericO (2016), p. 104.
158 esTLunD (2018), p. 320.
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79.  As regards labour law, future statutory changes will depend on the level 
of automation of the labour market. Since most scholars predict that the 
latter will remain only partially automated in the upcoming few decades, 
Human workers will not become extinct and artificial agents will continue 
to be viewed as means of production, at least until we reach the AGI 
stage. 
80.  As means of production, AIs are not likely to benefit from the employee 
status, namely because they lack the capacity to voluntarily enter in em-
ployment relationship. Moreover, the control exercised over AIs cannot 
be assimilated to that traditionally associated with subordination, given 
that AIs execute pre-programmed orders and have limited autonomy in 
deciding on how to attain a preassigned goal. Finally, AIs do not need 
remuneration for the purpose of subsistence. In sum, from a ratione 
materiae perspective, employment’s constitutive elements (work perfor-
mance, subordination and remuneration) will probably not be conceptu-
ally altered due to AI’s ‘take-over’ of labour. This implies, from a ratione 
personae perspective, that Humans will continue to be the exclusive 
subjects of labour law. It is, in this sense, highly unlikely that the personal 
scope of application of the latter will extend to non-Human agents any 
time soon.
81.  This being said, several scholars have pointed out that automation will 
affect labour law’s core values. Estlund (2018) wrote: “we urgently need 
to reintroduce the discourse related to a human right to work, once again 
shifting the focus from labour rights to the dignity of the person.”159 Hu-
man dignity will – yet again – be front and center, given that automation, 
albeit partial, will polarize the labour market, creating a sharp and deeply 
felt wage inequality between the qualified and the less qualified workers. 
This will call for a reinforcement of labour law’s protective mission. We 
felt the need for such reinforcement in the context of non-standard work, 
which leads to a “rampant increase of social inequality, the exclusion of 
some categories of workers from labour rights protection and the need, 
more generally (…) to reinforce those protections.”160 
82.  Ensuring better protection of the workers is an issue of labour policy (the 
second series of conclusions mentioned above). Regulators will have 
to raise defensive shields against the risk that workers be altogether 
deprived of work and means of subsistence, with little or no possibili-
ty to re-enter the automated labour market. Preventing and fighting off 
159 Idem, p. 708.
160 Idem, p. 698.
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technological unemployment will, indeed, be one of the main goals of 
future regulators. As stressed by Nedelkoska et al. (2018),161 education 
and on-the-job training will be key in attaining this goal. This can be 
done through adjusting education and training programs in view of al-
lowing the workers to become more AI-literate and/or develop skills that 
are likely to be high-in-demand in future automated sectors. In entirely 
automated sectors (essentially concerning blue-collar professions), the 
challenge will be greater: how can a fast-food restaurant employee di-
versify her skills if these are very few to begin with? This worker would 
presumably be obliged to further her training and acquire an altogether 
new set of skills which will require time and resources. It will, therefore, 
be imperative for labour policies to set out the guidelines and strategies 
that will enable a smoother transition from all-Human to partially or en-
tirely dehumanized sectors in the labour market. 
83.  It follows that, through its effect on labour, automation will affect labour 
law, not in its concepts but in its values, the reinforcement of which will 
be triggered by a peculiar labour paradox: the progressive dehumaniz-
ing of the labour market will not eliminate, but reaffirm the place of the 
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